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Abstract
We develop a political economy model of growth to examine economic development led by the
interactions between an economic decision concerning a rm's production technology (CRS vs IRS
technology) and a political decision concerning public infrastructures. We show that multiple equi-
librium growth paths occur due to dierences in expectations regarding the quality of public infras-
tructures. These multiple paths illustrate why economies with poor initial conditions can catch up
to and, furthermore, overtake economies with better initial conditions. Our result could explain the
experiences of some East Asian countries where co-evolutions of public infrastructures and industrial
transformations spurred economic development.
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1 Introduction
Over the past ve decades, several East Asian countries, including Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, have
experienced rapid growth because of the drastic industrial transformation of production organizations
from engaging in obsolete, inecient small-scale production to developing modern, ecient large-scale
production. However, many other countries have struggled with poverty because they have continued to
engage in inecient small-scale production.1 The adoption of large-scale production is one of the signif-
icant driving forces behind economic development (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Nurkse, 1953). Murphy et
al. (1989 in p1003) states that \[V]irtually every country that experienced rapid growth of productivity
and living standards over the last 200 years has done so by industrializing. Countries that have success-
fully industrialized { turned to production of manufactures taking advantage of scale economies { are
the ones that grew rich, be they eighteenth-century Britain or twentieth-century Korea and Japan."
Increasing the eciency of large-scale production requires sucient aggregate demand and high-
quality infrastructures. In particular, the roles of public infrastructures (e.g., power plants, transporta-
tion, telecommunication, property rights of institutions) are essential. For example, Tybou's (2000)
survey of empirical studies of manufacturing sectors argues that the high proportion of very small rms
in developing countries partly stems from their weak transportation systems, uncertainty about policies,
poor rule of law, and corruption. Kumar et al. (2005) and Leaven and Woodru (2007) also provide em-
pirical evidence of a positive relationship between rm size and the quality of legal institutions. Moreover,
World Bank (1994) provides convincing evidence that public infrastructures have played crucial roles in
drastic industrial transformations in East Asian countries. Table 1 shows GDP and infrastructure stock
at their 1995 levels as multiples of their 1975 levels, which is calculated by Straub et al. (2008). East
Asia's economic growth and accumulation of infrastructure stocks has outpaced those of other regions.
Co-evolutions of infrastructure and industrial transformation induced economic development in these
countries.
Note that large-scale production rms come to rely more heavily on public infrastructures. For
example, they require more reliable power grids for their advanced equipment and more developed
transportation systems for their commodity distributions. Thus, as the number of rms that adopt
large-scale production increases, large expenditures for public infrastructures are more likely to gain
political support. This hypothesis is in line with Wagner's (1893) law that the transformation from a
1For example, see Evans (1995) for an illustration of the industrial transformation of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.
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traditional society to an industrialized society is accompanied by a surge in demand for public services
such as education, health care, and infrastructure. In fact, Randolph et al. (1996) and Sturm (2001)
show that the per capita expenditures for public infrastructures strongly respond to changes in the per
capita income and that the estimated income elasticity of the per capita expenditures exceeds unity.
The purpose of this paper is to examine how interactions between political decisions for public infras-
tructures and economic decisions for production organizations aect the long-run process of economic
development. We show that multiple growth paths occur due to interactions between political and eco-
nomic decisions. In our model, self-fullling properties of voting can occur and lead to multiple equilibria.
The intuition is as follows. If people rationally anticipate large expenditures for public infrastructures as
a political outcome, they will begin to employ large-scale production even when potential aggregate de-
mand is still small. Once this is accomplished, it is indeed optimal for them to agree to large expenditures
for public infrastructures in relatively early stages of economic development. In contrast, if people ratio-
nally anticipate small expenditures for public infrastructures, they will continue to employ small-scale
production until the economy's aggregate demand becomes suciently large. Once this is accomplished,
it is indeed optimal for them to agree to small expenditures for public infrastructures in relatively early
stages of economic development. Hence, even for economies with equivalent initial conditions, the dier-
ence between their expectations of political outcomes concerning public infrastructures leads to dierent
processes of evolution concerning public infrastructures, rms' production organizations, and per capita
income.2
This \multiple growth paths" result could explain why relatively backward economies with relatively
poor initial conditions can catch up to and, furthermore, overtake more advanced economies with better
initial conditions. Suppose the former adopts ecient large-scale production earlier than the latter
due to success in the coordination of decisions on production organizations and the corresponding high
level of political supports for public infrastructures. Then, an equilibrium outcome is the result of an
economy with relatively poor initial conditions rapidly catching up to and overtaking the economy with
better initial conditions. This result helps us to understand how such rapid transformations are related
to dierences in the evolution of public infrastructures and production organizations across countries
2It is well known that agents' expectations about future policy may be self-fullling when public policy is endogenous.
In particular, Saint-Paul and Verdier (1997) derive a similar multiplicity result in a voting model regarding the interaction
between capital income tax and saving decisions. As we will explain later, what is important for the occurrence of multi-
plicity in our model is that each rm makes its irreversible decision on production organization prior to the determination
of public policy. Once the rm employs the large-scale production organization, it is usually dicult to instantly return to
the small-scale production organization. Thus, the production organization decision is one of the most irreversible decisions
for any rm. The possibility that the feedback mechanism between economic and political decisions generates multiple
equilibria has been noted in various contexts (e.g., Glomm and Ravikumar, 1996; Hessler et al., 2003).
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(Gerschekron, 1962; Rodrik, 2005). In particular, our result is partly consistent with the experiences of
some East Asian countries where co-evolutions of public infrastructures and industrial transformations
spurred economic development.
In addition, this paper notes the critical role of eciency in public service production. Eciency is
determined by the quality of bureaucratic and legal procedures. If eciency is high, production organi-
zation changes monotonically from small-scale to large-scale production. Along with this change, people
are more willing to support increases in public infrastructure expenditures. Due to these co-evolutions of
production organization and public infrastructures, the economy eventually converges to the steady state
equilibrium characterized by \high quality infrastructures, large-scale production, and high per-capita
income." However, if eciency is low, the economy is trapped in the steady state equilibrium character-
ized by \low quality infrastructures, small-scale production, and low per-capita income." Moreover, if
eciency is at an intermediate value, multiple steady state equilibria exist. Under some parameter re-
gions, even economies with equivalent initial conditions may converge to dierent steady state equilibria
due to dierential expectations about the quality of public infrastructures. This \multiple steady state
equilibria" result suggests that small dierences in the eciency of public service production can account
for large dierences in the per capita income across countries (La Porta et al., 2008; Chakraborty and
Dabla-Norris, 2011).
This paper is related to the literature on public infrastructures and economic growth (e.g., Barro, 1990;
Agenor, 2010; Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris, 2011). These studies show that public infrastructures have
growth-promoting eects through various channels (e.g., productivity of private inputs, complementarity
eects on private investment, and the production of health and education services).3 However, as noted
by Agenor (2010), the eect of public infrastructure on economic growth through its impact on a rm's
choice of technology has not been yet rigorously examined, although this channel is critical. We examine
this issue. The present paper is also related to theoretical studies of big-push arguments (e.g., Murphy
et al., 1989; Matsuyama, 1992; Rodrik, 1996; Wang and Xie, 2004). For example, a pioneering study by
Murphy et al. (1989) proposes an intuitive model of multiple equilibria arising from aggregate demand
externality. In their model, each sector's adoption of large-scale production increases the demand for the
other sectors' products through the rise in income induced by the adoption of large-scale production.
These interactions between private rms' choices of technology and their market size lead to multiple
equilibria: a large-scale production equilibrium and a small-scale production equilibrium. Although we
3See, for example, Agenor and Moreno-Dodson (2006) for survey.
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share a common framework and interests with these studies, we focus on the multiple equilibria arising
from the interactions between political decisions concerning public infrastructures and economic decisions
concerning technology choices. This paper adds new insights to the literature by considering the political
decision concerning public infrastructure explicitly.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the basic model. Section 3 describes rms'
economic decisions on production organization and political decisions on expenditures for public infras-
tructures. Section 3 characterizes a rational-expectation equilibrium and shows that multiple equilibria
occur under some parameter conditions. Section 5 characterizes the dynamic properties of the economy
and discusses the eect of the eciency of government service production. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The Model
Consider an overlapping-generations economy in which activity extends over innitely discrete time.
There are two types of goods in this economy: a unique nal good and a variety of intermediate goods
indexed by i 2 [0; 1]. The nal good is produced by competitive rms using a variety of intermediate
goods, capital, and labor as inputs, while each intermediate good i is produced by one monopoly rm
using the nal good as input. Capital depreciates completely after one period of use in production.
2.1 Individuals
In each period t, a generation containing a continuum of identical individuals of measure one joins the
economy. Individuals, each of whom lives for two periods (young and old age), obtain utility from their
second-period consumption. The young individuals supply one unit of labor and save all wage income
wt. The old individuals do not supply any labor, but earn accrued interest t+1wt. Additionally, the old
individuals are endowed with the property rights on the production sites of intermediate goods. Each
of them becomes an owner of intermediate-good rm i and earns monopoly prots t+1(i). Because
lump-sum tax t+1 is levied on each old individual, each old individual's after-tax income is given by
t+1wt + t+1(i)  t+1.
2.2 Final Good Sector
The output produced in the nal good sector in period t, Yt, is governed by a Cobb-Douglas, constant-
returns-to-scale production technology such that
Yt = K
1  
t L

t
Z 1
0
xt(i)
di;  > 0;  > 0; +  < 1; (1)
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where Kt is the amount of capital employed in the nal good sector, Lt is the amount of labor, and xt(i)
is the amount of intermediate good i 2 [0; 1] used as input. For clarity, we rewrite (1) as
Yt = A
1 
t
Z 1
0
xt(i)
di
where At  (K1  t Lt)
1
1  . Furthermore, to avoid unnecessary lexicographic explanations, we focus
our analysis on the case where   12 .
Let pt(i), wt, and t represent the price of intermediate good i, the wage of workers, and the rental
rate of capital in period t, respectively. The conditions for prot maximization in the competitive nal
good sector are consistent with the following conditions in factor markets:
pt(i) = A
1 
t xt(i)
 1; (2)
wt = 
A1 t
R 1
0
xt(i)
di
Lt
; (3)
t = (1    )
A1 t
R 1
0
xt(i)
di
Kt
: (4)
As explained above, only young individuals supply labor as waged workers who are only employed in the
nal good sector. Thus, in equilibrium, we obtain Lt = 1, and At = K
1  
1 
t .
2.3 Intermediate Good Sector
Each intermediate good i is produced by one monopoly rm owned by an old individual. Recalling the fact
that the variety of intermediate goods is normalized to one, each old individual possesses one monopoly
rm producing a specic intermediate good i. Each intermediate-good rm can access two types of
technologies: the \old technology" and the \new technology." A production function of intermediate
good i is given as follows.
xt(i) = 
j
tztst(i); (5)
where
jt =
(
1 with old technology (j = O);
 > 1 with new technology (j = N):
st(i) denotes the nal-good input devoted to producing intermediate good i. 
j
tzt denotes the rm's
eective productivity level given technology j, which depends on both the technology specic term
jt and the quality of public infrastructures zt, such as economic infrastructures in the form of power
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plant, transport, telecommunication and legal infrastructures in the form of court and law enforcement
institutions.4
Because  > 1, the new technology's marginal cost of production of intermediate goods is smaller than
that of the old technology's (i.e., 1=(zt) < 1=zt). However, old individuals need to make an investment
in employing the new technology, which costs F in terms of nal goods. The xed cost of production of
intermediate goods is expressed as
F j =
(
0 with old technology (j = O);
F with new technology (j = N):
Our specication of choice between old technology and new technology follows Murphy et al.'s (1989)
specication of the choice between production technology with constant returns to scale (CRS) and
one with increasing returns to scale (IRS). The rm with new technology (i.e., IRS) requires a xed
cost of F but then yields output more eciently than the rm with old technology (i.e., CRS) because
 > 1. With respect to production organization, following Thesmar and Theong (2000), we interpret the
rm's transition from old technology to new technology as the transition from \small-scale production
organization" to \large-scale production organization."
Given technology j, each old individual maximizes prot
jt (i) = pt(i)xt(i)  [
xt(i)
jtzt
+ F j ]
= A1 t xt(i)
   [xt(i)
jtzt
+ F j ]:
(6)
The optimal choice of xt(i) is xt(i) = 
2
1  (jtzt)
1
1 At = 
2
1  (jtzt)
1
1 K
1  
1 
t , for all i 2 [0; 1]. Then,
the equilibrium price is pt(i) =
1
jtzt
, for all i 2 [0; 1], and the equilibrium gross prot given technology
j is
jt (i) = (
j
tzt)

1 K
1  
1 
t   F j ; 8i 2 [0; 1]; (7)
where   (1   ) 1+1  . Hence, given technology j, each old individual sells the same amount of inter-
mediate goods, charges the same price, and obtains the same amount of prots.
2.4 Public Infrastructures and Productivity
The specication in (5) that the rm's eective productivity level is positively related with the quality
of public infrastructures zt has been widely used in theoretical analyses (e.g., Barro, 1990 and Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006) and is empirically supported at the macro and micro levels (e.g., Cohen and Paul,
4In the next subsection, we will discuss the reason why we suppose the rm's eective productivity level depends also
on zt.
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2004 and Hulten et al., 2006).5 For example, adequate transport facilities lower transportation costs, and
reliable supplies of electricity lower energy costs. These cost savings lead to higher levels of productivity
for intermediate-good rms.
Before going forward, it will help to keep in mind how the prot jt (i) in (7) depends upon the
quality of public infrastructures zt. From (7), we can easily conrm that
@Nt (i)
@zt
>
@Ot (i)
@zt
> 0 for all i
hold because  > 1. This result indicates that new technology rms can obtain larger prot gains from
per-unit improvements in public infrastructures than old technology rms. In this sense, the quality
of public infrastructures is more relevant for new technology rms than old technology rms. This is
derived from the complementary relationship between the technology-specic term, jt , and the quality
of public infrastructures, zt, specied in (5).
This specication in (5) is justied by the following arguments. New technology's lower marginal
cost of production relative to old technology is achieved by building a new factory or introducing new
equipment for a large-scale production. To pay o xed costs for these investments and make a prot,
suciently large amounts of production are necessary for rms. To do exercise these large-scale invest-
ments and productions, new technology rms rely more heavily on public infrastructures in the form
of power plants, transportation, and telecommunication than old technology rms.6 Furthermore, new
technology rms depend more heavily on public legal institutions than old technology rms because
large-scale investment and production require more market-based complex economic transactions for
which the formal enforceability of contracts by public institutions plays an important role.7 Thus, the
new technology's eective productivity becomes more relevant to the quality of public infrastructures
than the old technology's eective productivity. The complementary relationship between jt and zt in
(5) captures these facts in a reduced-form way.8
5For instance, Hulten et al. (2006) using data from Indian states nd a substantial externality eect from states'
infrastructures to manufacturing productivity. For the period from 1972-1992, they nd that the growth of road and
electricity-generating capacity accounted for nearly half of the growth of the productivity residual of India's registered
manufacturing.
6The amount of xed cost, F , might be negatively related to the quality of public infrastructures, zt. Such an extension
does not alter main arguments, but it requires unnecessary lexicographic explanations.
7Informal bilateral arrangements are only feasible if there is no information asymmetry, which requires certain conditions
such as geographic proximity and no alternative trading partner. Information asymmetries increase as markets grow in size
and geography. Therefore, the role of formal legal institutions becomes more critical to governing transactions between
strangers.
8Penrose (1959) and Chandler (1962) argue that decentralization was essential to the emergence of large rms. When
rm owners are constrained over the number of decisions they can make, managers, who typically have better information
than rm owners, can complete the task more eciently than the owners. If this is the case, decentralization by delegating
decision-making authorities form owners to managers is eective. Public legal institutions are essential to the proper
functioning of decentralization. In our model, the new technology's lower marginal cost of production relative to the old
technology can be interpreted as the result of more decentralized decision-making inside of rms due to the introduction
of a new labor management system. Firm owners will be willing to delegate their authorities when the judicial systems
works eectively such that the owners do not fear theft by their managers. Thus, even under this interpretation, the new
technology's eective productivity becomes more relevant to the quality of public infrastructures than the old technology's
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2.5 Government Budget
The quality of public infrastructures, zt, is positively related to the level of public expenditure on
maintaining and improving these infrastructures, Gt. We suppose that zt is increasing and a strictly
concave function of public expenditure, Gt, and we specify its functional form as
zt =  (Gt);  > 0; (8)
where  G() > 0,  GG() < 0,  (0) = z > 0, limGt!1  (Gt) = z < 1. The parameter  captures the
eciency of public service production. The larger value of  indicates the higher eciency of public
service production.9
In our model, the beneciaries of public infrastructures are only old individuals who own intermediate-
good rms. Therefore, we simply assume that the public expenditure in period t is nanced by a lump-
sum tax t on old individuals, which satises t = Gt. From (8), the inverse function of zt =  (Gt) can
be described as
Gt =  
 1(
zt

)  C(zt;); (9)
where Cz() > 0, Czz() > 0, limzt!z C(zt;) = 0, limzt!z C(zt;) =1, C() < 0, lim!0 Cz(zt;) =
1, and lim!1 Cz(zt;) = 0. In addition, we assume Cz(z;) = 0 for simplicity. Hence, the lump-sum
tax t on old individuals is given by
t = Gt = C(zt;): (10)
3 Technology Choice and Political Decision
3.1 Timing of Events
Now, we describe the political decision concerning public infrastructures. Because old individuals are
the direct beneciaries of public infrastructures and taxpayers in period t, we demonstrate that public
expenditures in period t, Gt, is decided by a vote among old individuals. We can replace the political
decision problem of Gt with the political decision problem of the quality of public infrastructures, zt,
because the value of Gt corresponds to zt in a one-to-one manner from (10). Following Lindbeck and
Weibul (1987), we employ a probabilistic voting framework where a political platform in period t simply
maximizes a weighted utility of voters (i.e., old individuals) in period t.
eective productivity.
9In the last paragraph of 5.3, we will discuss some elements that inuence  as introducing empirical ndings.
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We focus our analysis on the situation where a government cannot commit to its policies on public
infrastructures ex ante.10 To describe this situation in the simplest way, following Saint-Paul and Verdier
(1997), we assume that political decision Gt (or zt) is made after the old individuals' choice of technology.
Thus, the timing of the events is summarized as follows.
1. At the beginning of each period t, each old individual decides her or his type of technology. This
decision is irreversible. In making this decision, each old individual treats the technology choices
of other individuals as given and has perfect foresight regarding the outcome of the future voting
process over expenditures for public infrastructures.
2. After making their technology choices, all old individuals vote on a policy concerning expenditures
for public infrastructures, and a political platform in period t determines the level of Gt (or zt) to
maximize a weighted utility of old individuals in period t.
We should comment on a few critical issues regarding to timing. First, a production organization
decision is one of the most irreversible decisions for any rms simply because once rms employ the
large-scale production organization, it is usually dicult for them to instantly return back to a small-
scale production organization. Second, rms decide their production organizations based upon their
expectation of the outcome of future political process. As stressed by Acemoglu et al. (2005), there
is an inherent commitment problem in politics. Politicians who care about their future elections may
not necessarily try to keep past promises. Thus, it is important for rms to expect the outcome of
future political processes when they need to make a crucial managerial decision such as a determination
on their production organizations. Finally, related to above two issues, old individuals' preferences for
public expenditures are directly aected by whether they adopted new technology beforehand. This
timing of voting is critical for our following main arguments.
3.2 Technology Choice
We consider the old individual's technology choice problem. Suppose old individuals adopt new technol-
ogy, Nt (i) > 
O
t (i). From (7), 
N
t (i) > 
O
t (i) holds if and only if,
zet > F^K
  1  
t  z^(Kt); (11)
10This non-commitment assumption may not be realistic, but the perfect commitment assumption is also unrealistic.
The truth may lie between these two extreme cases. In this paper, we focus on the non-commitment case to clarify the
main implication of our work.
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where F^  [ F
(

1  1)
]
1 
 . The quality of public infrastructures, zt, is determined in the second-stage
voting process. This implies that in the rst stage, old individuals decide their type of technology based
on their expectation about zt, which is represented by z
e
t in (11). The optimal technology choice can be
illustrated in Figure 1. Suppose zet > z^(Kt) (resp. z
e
t < z^(Kt)), all individuals choose new technology
(resp. old technology), suppose zet = z^(Kt). Then, each old individual is indierent regarding whether to
choose new technology or old technology. Hence, new technology and old technology rms may coexist
only when zet = z^(Kt).
Figure 1 implies that old individuals prefer new technology to old technology when the level of capital,
Kt, is high or when the expected quality of public infrastructures, z
e
t , is high. The advantage of the new
technology relative to the old technology is its lower marginal cost of production. The marginal benet
of this advantage becomes more critical as the size of demand for intermediate goods (henceforth, the
market size) becomes larger. From (2) and At = K
1  
1 
t , the higher Kt leads to the larger market size,
and old individuals are more likely to choose new technology. Moreover, the higher zet leads to the higher
productivity rise in the new technology relative to the old technology. Consequently, old individuals are
more likely to choose new technology.
Let dt 2 [0; 1] be the share of old individuals who choose new technology in period t. From (11) and
Figure 1, we obtain following results.
dt =
(
0 if zet < z^(Kt);
1 if zet > z^(Kt);
and dt 2 [0; 1] if zet = z^(Kt): (12)
This result that the higher quality of public infrastructures leads to the larger production organization
is consistent with empirical ndings. For example, Tybou (2000) argues that the high proportion of
very small rms in developing countries partly stems from their weak transportation system, uncertainty
about policies, poor rule of law, and corruption. Kumar et al. (2005) nd a positive relationship between
rm size and the quality of legal institutions using data from thirteen Europeans countries. Leaven and
Woodru (2007) also document a similar positive relationship in Mexico and provide evidence that this
link is causal using the instrumental variable approach.
3.3 Probabilistic Voting
We consider the political decision problem concerning the quality of public infrastructures, zt. The
political decision of zt is determined within a probabilistic voting framework. In our model, as individuals
11
obtain utility from their second-period consumption, the political platform in period t simply maximizes
a weighted after-tax income level of old individuals in period t.
Recall that an old individual's after-tax income in period t is given by twt 1 + t(i)  t. From (7)
and (10), the political objective function is given by
Wt = dtv
N (zt;Kt) + (1  dt)vO(zt;Kt)  C(zt;); (13)
where
vN (zt;Kt)  twt 1 + (zt) 1 K
1  
1 
t   F;
vO(zt;Kt)  twt 1 + (zt) 1 K
1  
1 
t :
vN (zt;Kt) (resp. v
O(zt;Kt)) represents the pre-tax income level of old individuals who choose new
technology (resp. old technology) in period t. Note that dt is already determined in the rst stage (i.e.,
the old individual's technology choice stage). Thus, the policy maker's rst order condition with respect
to zt given t is
dtv
N
z (zt;Kt) + (1  dt)vOz (zt;Kt) = Cz(zt;); (14)
where
vNz (zt;Kt) 

1   

1  (zt)

1  1K
1  
1 
t ;
vOz (zt;Kt) 

1   (zt)

1  1K
1  
1 
t :
Because  > 1, vNz (zt;Kt) > v
O
z (zt;Kt) holds for all zt > 0. As shown in Figure 2,

1   1 results in the
policy maker's optimal value of zt being determined uniquely as a function of dt, Kt and  as follows.
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zpt  zp(dt;Kt;) =
8><>:
zO(Kt;) if dt = 0;
dtz
N (Kt;) + (1  dt)zO(Kt;) if dt 2 [0; 1];
zN (Kt;) if dt = 1;
(15)
where
zO(Kt;)  fzt j vOz (zt;Kt) = Cz(zt;)g;
zN (Kt;)  fzt j vNz (zt;Kt) = Cz(zt;)g:
zO(Kt;) (resp. z
N (Kt;) ) represents the politically determined value of zt when all old individu-
als choose old technology (resp. new technology). Because vNz (zt;Kt) > v
O
z (zt;Kt) and dt 2 [0; 1],
zN (Kt;)  dtzN (Kt;) + (1   dt)zO(Kt;)  zO(Kt;) holds for all Kt > 0. Moreover, as shown in
11Note that we assume   1
2
.
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Appendix A, we nd (i) zpd() > 0, zjK() > 0, and zj() > 0 for j = O;N and (ii) limKt!0 zj(Kt;) = z,
limKt!1 z
j(Kt;) = z, lim!0 zj(Kt;) = 0, and lim!1 zj(Kt;) =1 for j = P;O;N .
Our results imply that the politically determined quality of public infrastructures, zpt , is increasing
both in the share of old individuals who choose new technology, dt, and in the level of capital, Kt. The
rm with new technology can obtain larger prots from per-unit improvements in public infrastructures
than that with old technology because the quality of public infrastructures is more relevant for the former
than the latter. Thus, dt has a positive eect on z
p
t . Moreover, the higher Kt leads to larger market size,
which increases all old individuals' marginal prot from per-unit improvements in public infrastructures.
Thus, Kt also has a positive eect on z
p
t .
In summary, large expenditures on public infrastructures are more likely to be politically supported
both when many rms employ large-scale production and when the market size is large. This result
is consistent with the predictions of Wagner's law (1893), which claims that the transformation from
a traditional society to an industrialized society is accompanied by a surge in demand for public in-
frastructures. For example, Randolph et al. (1996) show that income elasticity of expenditures on
public infrastructures exceeds unity by using pooled cross-sectional time-series data from 1980-1986 for
27 less-developed countries. Sturm (2001) also examines panel data for 123 less-developed countries from
1970-1998 and nds a similar high income elasticity of public capital spending.
4 Perfect Foresight Equilibrium
4.1 Rational Expectation Equilibrium
This section characterizes rational-expectation equilibria of the quality of public infrastructures, zt. In
the rst stage (i.e., the technology-choice stage), old individuals decide their type of technology based
on their expectation about zt in the second stage (i.e., the voting stage). Rational expectation requires
that old individuals' expectations about zt (i.e., z
e
t ) in the rst stage be consistent with the politically
determined quality of zt in the second stage (i.e., z
p
t ). Let z

t be a rational-expectation equilibrium of
zt. From (12) and (15), z

t satises the following conditions.
zt = z
(Kt;) =
8><>:
zO(Kt;) if z

t < z^(Kt);
d(Kt;)zN (Kt;) + [1  d(Kt;)]zO(Kt;) if zt = z^(Kt);
zN (Kt;) if z

t > z^(Kt);
(16)
where
d(Kt;)  fdt j dtzN (Kt;) + (1  dt)zO(Kt;) = z^(Kt)g:
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On the one hand, from (15), both zN (Kt;) and z
O(Kt;) are increasing inKt and satisfy limKt!0 z
j(Kt;) =
z and limKt!1 z
j(Kt;) = z for j = O;N . On the other hand, from (11), z^(Kt) is decreasing in Kt
and satises limKt!0 z^(Kt) =1 and limKt!1 z^(Kt) = 0. Thus, zN (Kt;) (resp. zO(Kt;)) intersects
with z^(Kt) only once at Kt = K() (resp. Kt = K() ) where
K()  fKt j z^(Kt) = zN (Kt;)g;
K()  fKt j z^(Kt) = zO(Kt;)g: (17)
Because zN (Kt;) > z
O(Kt;) for all Kt > 0, K() < K() holds. Moreover, as described in Appendix
B, K() < 0, K() < 0, lim!0 K() =1, lim!1 K() = 0, lim!0K() =1, and lim!1K() =
0 hold. Thus, using K() and K(), we can rewrite (16) as follows:
zt = z
(Kt;) =
8><>:
zO(Kt;) if Kt < K();
z^(Kt) if Kt 2 [K(); K()];
zN (Kt;) if Kt > K():
(18)
The bold line in Figure 3 represents the results. The results are summarized as the following proposition.
Proposition 1. 1. If Kt < K(), then z

t = z
O(Kt;) is a unique rational-expectation equilibrium
of zt.
2. If Kt > K(), then z

t = z
N (Kt;) is a unique rational-expectation equilibrium of zt.
3. If K()  Kt  K(), then the following three rational-expectation equilibria of zt exist:
zt = z
(Kt;) =
8><>:
zO(Kt;);
z^(Kt);
zN (Kt;):
The proof of Proposition 1 is given in Appendix C. In the following analysis, we label the equilibrium
in which all old individuals choose new technology (i.e., dt = 1) and the politically determined quality of
public infrastructures satises zt = z
N (Kt;) as the \N-equilibrium." Similarly, we label the equilibrium
in which dt = 0 and z

t = z
O(Kt;) as the \O-equilibrium." We also label the equilibrium in which
dt 2 (0; 1) and zt = z^(Kt) as the \mixed equilibrium." In the region (a) of Figure 3, where Kt < K(),
the O-equilibrium is realized as a unique rational-expectation equilibrium. In the region (c) of Figure
3 where Kt > K(), the N-equilibrium is realized as a unique rational-expectation equilibrium. For
Kt 2 [K(); K()], which corresponds to the region (b) of Figure 3, there are three rational-expectation
equilibria.
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In the region of Kt 2 [K(); K()], which equilibrium is realized depends on each old individual's
expectation about zt. First, suppose that each old individual expects that all other old individuals will
choose the new technology. In this case, dt = 1 holds in the voting stage. From (15), a high-quality public
infrastructures (i.e., zN (Kt;)) is expected to be realized. Under this expectation, all old individuals are
willing to choose the new technology because zN (Kt;) > z^(Kt); thus, the N-equilibrium is realized as a
self-fullling equilibrium. Second, suppose that each old individual expects that all other old individuals
will choose the old technology. In this case, the O-equilibrium is realized as a self-fullling equilibrium
in a similar manner but through an inverse feedback eect in the case of realizing the N-equilibrium.
Finally, suppose that each old individual expects that a fraction d(Kt;) 2 (0; 1) of old individuals will
choose the new technology. In this case, the expectation about zt adjusts to satisfy z

t = z^(Kt). Each
old individual will be indierent between choosing the new technology and the old technology, and the
mixed equilibrium will be realized as a self-fullling equilibrium.
4.2 Multiple Equilibria and Their Selections
We can provide an informal explanation for the stability of the equilibria we derived above. Suppose the
economy is in the mixed equilibrium at EM in Figure 3 and that old individuals' expectations about zt
(i.e., zet ) has decreased (resp. increased) slightly from z^(Kt) for an exogenous reason. This circumstance
means that zet < z^(Kt) (resp. z
e
t > z^(Kt)) holds. Then, from (12), all old individuals have strict
incentives to choose the old technology (resp. the new technology), and the economy instantly deviates
from the mixed equilibrium at EM to reach the O-equilibrium at EO (resp. the N-equilibrium at EN ).
Therefore, the mixed equilibrium at EM in Figure 3 is unstable in that the economy cannot be returned
to the original equilibrium once it deviates from it. In contrast, both the O-equilibrium at EO and the
N-equilibrium at EN are stable. In the following analysis, as in Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011),
we focus our analysis on these stable equilibria.12 Henceforth, we can rewrite (18) as follows:
zt = z
(Kt;) =
(
zO(Kt;) if Kt  K();
zN (Kt;) if Kt  K():
(19)
12Explicit consideration of mixed equilibrium does not alter our main arguments, but it requires unnecessary lexicographic
explanations.
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5 Dynamic Properties
5.1 Steady State Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the dynamic properties of the economy. The equilibrium condition in the
capital market is given by Kt+1 = wt. By substituting Lt = 1, ; xt(i) = 
2
1  (zjt )
1
1 At, At = K
1  
1 
t ,
(3) and (19) into Kt+1 = wt, we obtain
Kt+1 =
8<:
[zO(Kt;)]

1 K
1  
1 
t  O(Kt;); if Kt  K();

[zN (Kt;)]

1 K
1  
1 
t  N (Kt;); if Kt  K();
(20)
where 
   21  . Because zN (Kt;) > zO(Kt;) and  > 1, N (Kt;) > O(Kt;) holds. Fur-
thermore, as shown in Appendix D, j() > 0, lim!0 j(Kt;) = 0, and lim!1 j(Kt;) = 1 for
j = O;N hold. Because K() < K(), there exist multiple equilibria in the region of Kt 2 (K(); K()),
where both the O-equilibrium and the N-equilibrium are realized as rational-expectation equilibria.
Figures 4 to 8 show several patterns of equilibrium dynamics. As shown in Figures 4 and 5, there may
exist two non-trivial steady state equilibria. We denote the point at which the 45 degree line intersects
with the graph of O(Kt;) (resp. 
N (Kt;)) as EO (resp. EN ) and dene the level of Kt at EO (resp.
EN ) as K
O() (resp. KN ()) where
KO()  fKt j Kt = O(Kt;)g;
KN ()  fKt j Kt = N (Kt;)g: (21)
KN () > KO() holds because N (Kt;) > 
O(Kt;). Moreover, as shown in Appendix D, K
j
() > 0,
lim!0Kj() = 0 and lim!1Kj() = 1 for j = O;N hold. From the argument in subsection 4.2,
in Figures 4 and 5, EO is the stable steady state equilibrium characterized by the O-equilibrium with
\old technology, low-quality public infrastructures and low capital per worker," while EN is the stable
steady state equilibrium characterized by the N-equilibrium with \new technology, high-quality public
infrastructures and high capital per worker."
5.2 Equilibrium Dynamics
Now, the magnitude relationships among KN (), KO(), K(), and K() lead us to several patterns of
equilibrium dynamics summarized in Figures 4 to 8. To avoid lexicographic explanations, we focus on
several interesting cases where intuitive results are obtained.13
13If we ignore trivial cases where equality holds among them, we have the following 6 patterns of the magnitude
relationships among KN (), KO(), K() and K(); (1) K() < KO() < K() < KN () (i.e., Figure 4), (2)
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Note the following properties: KN () > KO(), K() > K(), and Kj() > 0 for j = O;N ,
K() < 0 and K() < 0. When the eciency of public service production  is suciently high to
satisfy K() < KO(), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Suppose the eciency of public service production  is suciently high to satisfy K() <
KO(), then the economy eventually converges to the steady state equilibrium EN .
Figure 6 shows the case where K() < K() < KO() < KN () holds. The economy with any initial
capital K0 eventually converges to the steady state equilibrium EN (i.e., the N-equilibrium steady state).
When the economy lies in the region where Kt < K(), all old individuals choose old technology because
market size is still small and they expect the realization of low-quality public infrastructures. Thus, the
O-equilibrium is realized in the early stage of economic development. However, as the economy develops
and its capital level exceeds the threshold level of K() (i.e., Kt > K()), old individuals may begin to
employ new technology because the market size becomes large and they may expect political support
for high-quality public infrastructures. Moreover, when Kt > K(), all old individuals are convinced
of the realization of high-quality public infrastructures and have strict incentives to employ the new
technology. Then, the N-equilibrium is realized.14 This co-evolution among public infrastructures, the
production organizations of rms, and the per capita income is widely observed in the process of economic
development. While public infrastructures may aect income through a rm's organizational decision and
its productivity, economic growth can also shape the demand for public infrastructures and the political
support for them. Note here that the co-evolution generates a positive feedback mechanism. Better public
infrastructures are associated with ecient production organization and higher productivity. These
factors raise the per capita income, accelerate capital accumulation, and increase the size of the market
for intermediate goods. This market size expansion boosts the demand for public infrastructures and
increases the political support for them.
In addition, there exist multiple equilibria in the region ofKt 2 (K(); K()). The multiple equilibria
in this region could help us to understand why some relatively backward economies that were initially
lagging behind can catch up to and, moreover, overtake economies that were initially ahead. In Figure 7,
we depict two dierent economies that have dierent initial conditions K0 and K
0
0, where K
0
0 > K0. The
dashed arrow displays the equilibrium path of the economy with better initial condition K 00, while the
KO() < K() < K() < KN () (i.e., Figure 5), (3) K() < K() < KO() < KN () (i.e., Figure 6, 7), (4) KO() <
KN () < K() < K() (i.e., Figure 8), (5) K() < KO() < KN () < K(), and (6) KO() < K() < KN () < K().
Although we do not discuss cases (5) and (6) explicitly, the main implication obtained from case (5) (resp. case (6)) is
analogous to case (1) (resp. case (2)).
14In this paper, we implicitly assume that the transition from the old technology to the new technology occurs only once.
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straight arrow displays that with inferior initial conditionK0. In the early stage of economic development,
the economy with better initial condition K 00 is ahead of the economy with inferior initial condition K0.
However, as the level of capital rises, the backward economy can catch up to and eventually overtake the
initially advanced economy if the former can successfully adopt the new technology earlier than the latter
due to rm-level coordination of technology choices and the corresponding high levels of political support
for public infrastructures. This nding implies that the timing of the transition from the O-equilibrium
to the N-equilibrium is crucial for the emergence of rapid catch up and overtaking results.
Our result is partly consistent with experiences in some East Asian countries, such as Japan, South
Korea, and Taiwan, where co-evolutions of public infrastructures and industrial transformations spurred
economic growth. Note that it is still highly controversial whether governmental industrial policies
inuenced these events. On the one hand, Okazaki (1996) and Rodrik (1996) provide some convincing
anecdotal evidence that governmental industrial policies in some East Asian countries played critical
roles in coordinating private rms' investment activities. On the other hand, some studies stress the
importance of private initiatives. For example, Matsuyama (1996) states, \[E]ven if one can establish,
as convincingly as Okazaki's study (1996) on the Post WWII Japan and Rodrik (1996)'s study on Korea
and Taiwan, that government policies sometimes appear to have succeeded in coordination in intended
way, it does not follow that government was essential in achieving coordination in such instances. The
private initiative could have achieved the same or, even better, results." Matsuyama (1996) also notes,
\[O]kazaki's study (1996) stresses the role of government councils in facilitating coordination between
shipbuilding and steel industries. But, one can also point out a story of Eiichi Shibusawa, a private
entrepreneur, who achieved to coordinate between cotton textile and ocean shipping industries in Meiji
Japan."
With respect to the government's role in coordinating private sector activities, this paper provides
inherently skeptical views due to our assumption that government cannot commit to their policies ex
ante. In our model, as in other models of coordination failures, if private rms can coordinate their
technology choices, the economy can shift from the O-equilibrium to the N-equilibrium. However, in our
political decision framework, government policies (public infrastructures) only reect the results of private
sector technology decisions. Therefore, the prevalence of coordination failures in private sectors leads
to insucient supplies of public infrastructures, which in turn sustains the prevalence of coordination
failures in private sectors. In this sense, a government cannot play any active role in coordinating private
sector activities. Although this result is obvious from our political decision assumption, it may shed light
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on one of the inherent diculties of governmental coordination policies.15
5.3 Stagnation
The previous subsection focuses on the one extreme case where the eciency of public service production,
, is suciently high to satisfy K() < KO(). This subsection examines the opposite extreme case
where  is suciently low to satisfy KN () < K(), as shown in Figure 8. In this case, we obtain the
following proposition.
Proposition 3. Suppose the eciency of public service production  is suciently low to satisfy
KN () < K(); then, the economy eventually converges to the steady state equilibrium EO.
Figure 8 shows the case where the magnitude relationships KO() < KN () < K() < K(). In
this case, the economy with any initial capital K0 eventually converges to the steady state equilibrium
EO (i.e., the O-equilibrium steady state). Because the eciency of public service production, , is
suciently low, the lowest threshold level of capital K() where old individuals may potentially start to
choose new technology exceeds the highest steady state level of capital where the economy can potentially
achieve KN (). Consequently, all old individuals are convinced of the realization of low-quality public
infrastructures and have no incentives to employ new technology. The O-equilibrium is realized in the
steady state equilibrium. These results imply that the economy is trapped in the low-development steady
state equilibrium characterized by \old technology, low quality of public infrastructures, and low capital
per worker."
The results from Figures 6 to 8 suggest the critical impact of public service production eciency, ,
on long-run economic development.  is aected by several region-specic and historical factors, such
as the quality of bureaucrats, the origins of legal institutions, and the types of organic private-order
institutions.16 First, Chakraborty and Dabla-Norris (2011) show that a higher tendency of bureaucratic
corruption lowers the eciency of public service production and argue that the quality dierences in
public capital can potentially explain a large fraction of the income gap between rich and poor nations.
Second, the legal tradition adopted by countries (e.g., common law vs. civil law) has a long lasting impact
on the eciency of bureaucratic and legal procedures. Djankov et al. (2003) show that the exibility and
adaptability of legal institutions vary across legal traditions. While French Civil Code systems rely more
on formalistic procedures and judgments based narrowly on statutory law, the common law tradition
15See, for example, Matsuyama (1995, 1996) for a summary of the policy implications of coordination failures.
16Beck (2010) shows that certain types of organic private-order institutions, which are based on reputation and informal
relationships, complement the function of public legal institutions.
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embraces case law and judicial discretion. Beck et al. (2003, 2005) demonstrate that this dierence
in the adaptability of legal systems explains dierences in nancial sector development and economic
growth.17 Therefore, our theoretical results are partly consistent with these empirical ndings.
5.4 Multiple Equilibrium Paths and Multiple Steady State Equilibria
This subsection examines the cases where the eciency of public service, , has intermediate values in
the sense that both KN () < K() and K() < KO() do not hold.
Figure 4 shows the case where the magnitude relationships K() < KO() < K() < KN () hold.
In this case, even for the economies with equivalent initial capital K0, the economies in which dierent
expectations are formed in region where K() < Kt < K() may converge to dierent steady state
equilibria. As shown in Figure 4, on one equilibrium path, the economy succeeds in switching from the
O-equilibrium to the N-equilibrium and eventually converges to steady state equilibrium EN , while on
the other path, the economy remains at the O-equilibrium and converges to the steady state equilibrium
EO. However, note that EO lies in the region where K() < Kt < K() in Figure 4. This result
implies that even once the economy converges to EO, the economy can shift from the O-equilibrium
to the N-equilibrium and may possibly converge to EN if all individuals' technology choice are well
coordinated.
Figure 5 shows the case where the magnitude relationships KO() < K() < K() < KN ()
hold. In this case, suppose that the initial capital satises K0 > K() (resp. K0 < K()); then, the
economy eventually converges to EN (resp. EO). Moreover, suppose that the initial capital level lies
in region K0 2 [K(); K()]; then, we have multiple equilibrium paths. Even for the economies with
equivalent initial capital K0 2 [K(); K()], the economies in which dierent expectations are formed
may ultimately converge to dierent steady state equilibria, some of which converge to EN , while others
converge to EO. Note that EO lies in the region where Kt < K() in Figure 5. In this case, once the
economy converges to EO, it cannot escape from EO without exogenous parametric or policy changes.
Both Figures 4 and 5 show the case where there exists two non-trivial steady state equilibria EO and
EN . By comparing the steady state welfare level (the after-tax income level of old individuals) at EO
and EN , we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Suppose the eciency of public service production  is suciently high to satisfy
KN () > K(); then, the steady state welfare level at EN is higher than that at EO.
17Esfahani and Ramirez (2003) show that the growth eect via infrastructure depends on the strength of a country's
institutions, such as bureaucratic eciency and contract enforcement.
20
The proof of Proposition 4 is given in Appendix E. When KN () > K() holds, as in both Figures 4
and 5, the steady state welfare level at EN is higher than that at EO. Therefore, the economy converges to
the low-welfare steady state equilibrium if its initial capital is less than K() in Figure 5 or if individuals'
technology choices are not well coordinated in the region where K() < Kt < K() in Figures 4 and 5.
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Multiple steady state equilibria results shown in Figures 4 and 5 suggest that small dierences in the
eciency of public service production can account for large dierences in the per capita income across
countries. This suggestion implies, again, that the eciency of public service production matters. The
higher eciency of public service production enhances expectations for the realization of high-quality
infrastructures, induces the adoption of new technologies, and lowers the risk of the inferior steady state
equilibrium. Our model straightforwardly suggests that policies should aim to improve the quality of
monitoring and bureaucratic oversight and raise the exibility and adoptability of court procedures.
However, as mentioned above, the eciency of public service is aected by region-specic or historical
factors. Thus, the reform of these institutions must be observed in the context of the legal and historical
traditions of the economy.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a political economic model of growth to examine how a rm's economic decision
regarding production organization is aected by the quality of public infrastructures and economic de-
velopment and how a rm's economic decision aects political decisions concerning public infrastructures
and economic development. We showed that multiple-equilibrium growth paths occur due to these in-
teractions between economic and political decisions. Even economies with equivalent initial conditions
may follow dierent development paths if they have dierent expectations about the quality of public
infrastructures. These multiple growth paths could explain why backward economies with relatively poor
initial conditions can catch up to and, furthermore, overtake more advanced economies with relatively
better initial conditions. Our result is consistent with the experiences of some East Asian countries where
co-evolutions of public infrastructures and industrial transformations spurred economic development.
Appendix A
 zPd () > 0, zjK() > 0, zj() > 0 for j = O;N :
18As discussed in Appendix E, the condition KN () > K() is the sucient condition for which the steady state welfare
level at EN is higher than that at EO. Even if the condition K
N () > K() does not hold, there exists a range of
parameter regions for which the steady state welfare level at EN is higher than that at EO. In particular, ceteris paribus,
when the new technology's xed F is smaller or the eective productivity is higher, this parameter region becomes larger.
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By totally dierentiating (14), because vNz () > vOz (), vjzK() > 0 for j = O;N , czz() > 0 and
cz() < 0, we obtain
zPd () =
vNz ()  vOz ()
czz() > 0;
zPK() =
dtv
N
zK() + (1  dt)vOzK()
czz() > 0;
zP () =  
cz()
czz() > 0:
Noting zP (1;Kt;) = z
N (Kt;) and z
P (0;Kt;) = z
O(Kt;), we also conrm that the relations
zjK() > 0, zj() > 0 for j = O;N hold.
 limKt!0 zj(Kt;) = z, limKt!1 zj(Kt;) = z for j = P;O;N :
From (14), because limKt!0 v
N
z (zt;Kt) = 0, limKt!0 v
O
z (zt;Kt) = 0 and limzt!z cz(zt;) = 0, we
obtain limKt!0 z
j(Kt;) = z for j = P;O;N . Similarly, from (14), because limKt!1 v
N
z (zt;Kt) =
1, limKt!1 vOz (zt;Kt) = 1 and limzt!z cz(zt;) = 1, we obtain limKt!1 zj(Kt;) = z for
j = P;O;N .
 lim!0 zj(Kt;) = 0, lim!1 zj(Kt;) =1 for j = P;O;N :
From (14), because lim!0 cz(zt;) = 1, limzt!0 vNz (zt;Kt) = 1, limzt!0 vOz (zt;Kt) = 1, we
obtain lim!0 zj(Kt;) = 0 for j = P;O;N . Similarly, from (14), because lim!1 cz(zt;) = 0,
limzt!1 v
N
z (zt;Kt) = 0, limzt!1 v
O
z (zt;Kt) = 0, we obtain lim!1 z
j(Kt;) =1 for j = P;O;N
Appendix B
 K() < 0, K() < 0:
By totally dierentiating (17), because zj() > 0, zjK() > 0 for j = N;O and z^K() < 0, we obtain
K() =
zN ()
z^K()  zNK ()
< 0;
K() =
zO ()
z^K()  zOK()
< 0;
 lim!0 K() =1, lim!1 K() = 0:
From (14), because lim!0 zN (Kt;) = 0, limKt!1 z^(Kt) = 0, we obtain lim!0 K() = 1.
Moreover, because lim!1 zN (Kt;) = 1, limKt!0 z^(Kt) = 1, we obtain lim!1 K() = 0.
The proof of lim!0K() =1 and lim!1K() = 0 can be provided in a similar way.
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Appendix C
This Appendix only proves Propositions 1-1 and 1-3. The proof of Proposition 1-2 can be provided in a
similar way to Propositions 1-1 and 1-3.
Proof of Proposition 1-1
First, given Kt < K(), suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises z
e
t > z^(Kt).
From (12), all old individuals choose the new technology (i.e., dt = 1) because z
e
t > z^(Kt). Because
dt = 1, from (15), z
p
t = z
N (Kt;) is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation
requires that zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) < zN (Kt;). However, zN (Kt;) < z^(Kt) when Kt < K(), which is a
contradiction.
Second, suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises z
e
t = z^(Kt). From (12),
each old individual is indierent regarding whether to choose the new technology or the old technology
(i.e., dt 2 (0; 1)) because zet = z^(Kt). Because dt 2 (0; 1), from (15), zpt = dtzN (Kt;)+(1 dt)zO(Kt;)
is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation requires that zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) =
dtz
N (Kt;)+(1 dt)zO(Kt;). However, dtzN (Kt;)+(1 dt)zO(Kt;) < z^(Kt) because zO(Kt;) <
zN (Kt;) < z^(Kt) when Kt < K(), which is a contradiction.
Finally, suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises z
e
t < z^(Kt). From (12),
all old individuals choose the old technology (i.e., dt = 0) because z
e
t < z^(Kt). Because dt = 0, from
(15), zpt = z
O(Kt;) is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation requires that
zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) > zO(Kt;). This condition is satised when Kt < K(). Thus, zt = zO(Kt;) could
be a rational-expectation equilibrium value of zt.
As a result, any expectations except for zet = z
O(Kt;) result in a contradiction. Thus, when
Kt < K(), z

t = z
O(Kt;) is an unique rational-expectation equilibrium value of zt.
Proof of Proposition 1-3
First, given K()  Kt  K(), suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises zet >
z^(Kt). From (12), all old individuals choose new technology (i.e., dt = 1) because z
e
t > z^(Kt). Because
dt = 1, from (15), z
p
t = z
N (Kt;) is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation
requires that zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) < zN (Kt;). This condition is satised when K()  Kt  K(). Thus,
zt = z
N (Kt;) could be a rational-expectation equilibrium value of zt.
Second, suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises z
e
t = z^(Kt). From (12),
23
each old individual is indierent regarding whether to choose the new technology or the old technology
(i.e., dt 2 (0; 1)) because zet = z^(Kt). Because dt 2 (0; 1), from (15), zpt = dtzN (Kt;)+(1 dt)zO(Kt;)
is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation requires that zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) =
dtz
N (Kt;) + (1   dt)zO(Kt;). Note that there exists dt 2 [0; 1] that satises this condition because
zO(Kt;)  z^(Kt)  zN (Kt;) when K()  Kt  K(). Thus, zt = z^(Kt;) could be a rational-
expectation equilibrium value of zt.
Finally, suppose that all individuals expected the value of zt that satises z
e
t < z^(Kt). From (12),
all old individuals choose the old technology (i.e., dt = 0) because z
e
t < z^(Kt). Because dt = 0, from
(15), zpt = z
O(Kt;) is realized in the voting stage. In an equilibrium, rational expectation requires that
zet = z
p
t ) z^(Kt) > zO(Kt;). This condition is satised when Kt < K(). Thus, zt = zO(Kt;) could
be a rational-expectation equilibrium value of zt.
Appendix D
 j() > 0, lim!0 j(Kt;) = 0 and lim!1j(Kt;) =1 for j=O;N
From (20), because zj() > 0 for j = O;N , the relation j() > 0. In addition, because
lim!0 zj(Kt;) = 0, lim!1 zj(Kt;) =1, we obtain lim!0 j(Kt;) = 0 and lim!1 j(Kt;) =
1 for j=O;N .
 Kj() > 0, lim!0Kj() = 0, lim!1Kj() =1 for j = O;N
By totally dierentiating (21), because j() > 0 for j = O;N , jK() < 1, we obtain
Kj() =
j()
1  jK()
> 0 for j = O;N:
Furthermore, from (21), because lim!0 j(Kt;) = 0 and lim!1j(Kt;) = 1 for j = O;N ,
we obtain lim!0Kj() = 0, lim!1Kj() =1 for j = O;N .
Appendix E
We denote the steady state welfare level, which is represented by the after-tax income level of old
individuals at EO (resp. EN ), as W
O(zO(KO);KO) (resp. WN (zN (KN );KN )). Here, KO (resp. KN )
is the steady state capital level at EO (resp. EN ), and z
O(KO) (resp. zN (KN )) is the steady state quality
of public infrastructures at EO (resp. EN ). Here, we show thatW
N (zN (KN );KN ) > WO(zO(KO);KO)
holds when KN > K().
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By substituting (4), Kt = wt 1, xt(i) = 
2
1  (jtzt)
1
1 K
1  
1 
t , (15) and (21) into v
N (zt;Kt) C(zt;)
(resp. vO(zt;Kt)  C(zt;)) in (13), WO(zO(KO);KO) (resp. WN (zN (KN );KN )) is given by
WO(zO(KO);KO) = [(1    ) + (1  )]Y O(zO(KO);KO)  C(zO(KO));
WN (zN (KN );KN ) = [(1    ) + (1  )]Y N (zN (KN );KN )  C(zN (KN ))  F:
where
Y O(zO(KO);KO)   21  [zO(KO)] 1  (KO) 1  1  ;
Y N (zN (KN );KN )   21  [zN (KN )] 1  (KN ) 1  1  :
Y O(zO(KO);KO) (resp. Y N (zN (KN );KN )) is the steady state nal output at EO (resp. EN ), and
C(zO(KO)) (resp. C(zN (KN ))) is the steady state lump-sum tax at EO (resp. EN ). Moreover, the
term (1    )Y O(zO(KO);KO) (resp. (1    )Y N (zN (KN );KN )) expresses the steady state income
through capital holdings (i.e., twt 1) at EO (resp. EN ), while the term (1 )Y O(zO(KO);KO) (resp.
(1  )Y N (zN (KN );KN )) expresses the steady state income through intermediate good rm holdings
(i.e., t(i)) at EO (resp. EN ). Note that (1   )Y O(zO(KO);KO) ((1   )Y N (zN (KN );KN ))) is
rewritten as [zO(KO)]

1  (KO)
1  
1  (resp. [zN (KN )]

1  (KN )
1  
1  ).
Because  > 1 and zN (KN ) > zO(KO), we can easily conrm that
(1    )Y N (zN (KN );KN ) > (1    )Y O(zO(KO);KO)
holds. The steady state income through capital holdings at EN is always larger than that at EO.
Therefore, the sucient condition for WN (zN (KN );KN ) > WO(zO(KO);KO) is expressed as follows:
[zN (KN )]

1  (KN )
1  
1    C(zN (KN ))  F > [zO(KO)] 1  (KO) 1  1    C(zO(KO)):
Because the rst term in the right-hand side, [zO(K)]

1  (K)
1  
1    C(zO(K)), is an increasing
function of K and KN > KO, the above inequality always holds if
[zN (KN )]

1  (KN )
1  
1    C(zN (KN ))  F > [zO(KN )] 1  (KN ) 1  1    C(zO(KN )): (22)
As a result, (22) expresses the sucient condition for WN (zN (KN );KN ) > WO(zO(KO);KO).
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From the denition of z^(K) in (11),
(z)

1  (K)
1  
1    C(z)  F > (z) 1  (K) 1  1    C(z)
holds for z > z^(K). Furthermore, from the denition of K() in (17), the inequality zO(K) > z^(K)
holds for all K > K(). Then, for all K > K(),
[zO(K)]

1  (K)
1  
1    C(zO(K))  F > [zO(K)] 1  (K) 1  1    C(zO(K)):
From the denition of zN (K) in (19), we can easily conrm that the [zN (K)]

1  (K)
1  
1   C(zN (K)) 
F > [zO(K)]

1  (K)
1  
1    C(zO(K))  F . Then, for all K > K(),
[zN (K)]

1  (K)
1  
1    C(zN (K))  F > [zO(K)] 1  (K) 1  1    C(zO(K)):
holds.
As a result, suppose that KN > K(). We can conrm that equation (22) holds and that the
sucient condition for WN (zN (KN );KN ) > WO(zO(KO);KO) is satised.
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Figure 1: The Optimal Technology Choice
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Figure 2: The Policy Maker's Optimal Value of zt
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Figure 3: Rational Expectation Equilibria
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Figure 4: The Case Where K() < KO() < K() < KN ()
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Figure 5: The Case Where KO() < K() < K() < KN ()
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Figure 6: Monotone Convergence to EN
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Figure 7: Overtaking
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Figure 8: Monotone Convergence to EO
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Table 1: Growth of GDP and Infrastructure 
Stocks 1995 levels as multiples of 1975 levels 
GDP; PPP constant 2000 international $; Electricity-MW of generating capacity; 
Roads-km of paved road; Telecoms-number of main lines. 
Sources: Straub et al. (2008) in p2, table1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 GDP Electricity Roads Telecoms 
East Asia 4.8 5.9 2.9 15.5
South Asia 2.6 4.4 2.5 8.2 
Middle East & North Africa 1.8 6.1 2.1 7.2
Latin America & Caribbean 1.8 3.0 1.9 5.1 
OECD 1.8 1.6 1.4 2.2
Pacific 1.7 2.0  4.3 
Sub-Saharan Africa 1.4 2.6 1.7 3.9
Eastern Europe 1.0 1.6 1.2 6.9 
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